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On October 16, 2006, the United States Copyright Office
concluded in a Memorandum Opinion (the Ringtone Opinion) that,
subject to certain caveats, the Copyright Act's § 115 statutory license
applies to ringtones. 1 The Copyright Office concluded that ringtones
(including monophonic and polyphonic ringtones, as well as
mastertones) are phonorecords, and deliveries of ringtones by wire or
wireless transmission constitute digital phonorecord deliveries subject
to compulsory licensing under § 115.2
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1.
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. 64,303, 64,307 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
2.
Id. at 64,304.
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In the Ringtone Opinion, the Copyright Office provided a test
to determine whether a particular ringtone will qualify for the
statutory compulsory license under § 115. The opinion noted that
whether a particular ringtone falls within the scope of the statutory license will
depend primarily upon whether what is performed is simply the original musical
work (or a portion thereof), or a derivative work (i.e., a musical work based on the
original musical work but which is recast, transformed, or adapted in such a way
that it becomes an original work3 of authorship and would be entitled to copyright
protection as a derivative work).

The opinion explained further that "[r]ingtones that are merely
excerpts of a preexisting sound recording fall squarely within the
scope of the statutory license."4 On the other hand, "those that
contain additional material may actually be considered original
derivative works and therefore outside the scope of the Section 115
license." 5 The opinion reasoned that to be considered a derivative
work outside the bounds of the statutory license, a ringtone needs to
exhibit a degree of creativity sufficient to be copyrightable under the
traditional standard of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.6 Though not explicitly stated in the Ringtone Opinion, one
can infer that whether a ringtone is a derivative work is a key issue
because it implicates a third exclusive right of copyright-the
adaptation right (right to make derivative works)-that is not
included in the bundle of rights that come with a § 115 compulsory
7
license.
I. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
A. Who Now Decides Whether To Release Ringtones?
As a result of the Copyright Office's Ringtone Opinion,
whenever a new song is released under the authority of its copyright
8
owner, anyone can get a license to make and distribute ringtones of
3.
Id. at 64,303.
4.
Id. at 64,304.
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 64,310 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991)).
7.
The § 115 license by its terms only covers the reproduction and distribution
rights. 17 U.S.C.S. § 115 (2004 & Supp. 2007). A ringtone that would qualify as a
derivative work would seem to also require a separate license for the musical composition's
adaptation right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
8.
At least this is the case for monophonic and polyphonic ringtones. Mastertones
also require a sound recording license, usually from the record company, but as will be
discussed, the interests of record labels and musician/songwriters may not always be
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that song, regardless of whether the songwriter (or its music
publisher) approves, and regardless of whether any ringtones of that
song have been previously authorized or released by the songwriter or
To explain statutorily, a CD or digital music file is a
record company.
"phonorecord"9 of a musical work.
When those CDs or digital
downloads are "distributed to the public in the United States under
the authority of the copyright owner, any other person, including those
who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries, may . . .
obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of
the work." 10 Thus, the distribution of the music means that anyone,
including those without any affiliation with the artist or record label,
can get a compulsory license under § 115. The problem is that under §
115(c)(3)(A), those with a § 115 compulsory license also have the right
to distribute digital phonorecord deliveries of the musical work.1 1 And
now that ringtones are considered digital phonorecord deliveries, it
logically follows that anyone can distribute ringtones as soon as the
music is released. This is a mechanical, unbreakable formula. When
an artist releases music, he has licensed ringtones, even if he has
never offered any ringtones of the music himself and would never
want to.
1. The Risk to Songwriters
Helpless to prevent the licensing of their songs for ringtones,
certain songwriters may be forced to risk their artistic reputations to
unintended and unwarranted indications of ringtone sponsorship just
by releasing music. Now that every distribution (and perhaps even
non-commercial and promotional distributions) of recorded music
under the authority of the copyright holder creates a compulsory
license for ringtones under § 115, there will always be a risk to
songwriters that some third party will be making and selling
ringtones of their songs, and there is no "opt-out" provision for
songwriters who might not wish to sanction that format. Consumers
who hear those ringtones in public or who see those ringtones
aligned. See Edna Gundersen, Mastertones Ring Up Profits: With Millions Sold Every
Week, Record Labels Are Reveling in Revenue, Promotion Potential, USA TODAY, Nov. 29,
2006, at ID.
9.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "phonorecords" as "material objects in which
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device").
10.
Id. § 115(a)(1) (emphasis added).
11.
Id. § 115(c)(3)(A).

536

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW [Vol. 10:3:533

advertised in the marketplace are largely unaware of the delicate
nuances of copyright law. They hear a song they know by a musical
artist or songwriter they recognize, and they are likely to assume that
it was authorized, or at least licensed, by that artist or songwriter.
This association has the potential not only to tarnish the songwriter's
hard-earned reputation, but may also lead to serious economic
ramifications in an industry where reputation, image, and sales are
inexorably intertwined. For all songwriters and musical artists,
whether mainstream or independent, the way in which a song is
exploited commercially can affect their artistic reputation, and a
compulsory ringtone license would prevent them from exercising their
own artistic judgment as to what degrades the meaning of their works.
2. Can Songwriters Depend on Their Record Labels As Gatekeepers?
Having recognized the potential risks to songwriter reputation,
we recall that the popular mastertone format requires both a license
for the underlying musical work and a license for the sound recording
12
since it reproduces the actual recorded sounds of the musical track.
The question then arises: if songwriters cannot refuse a compulsory
license for ringtones derived from their musical compositions under
the Ringtone Opinion, will their record labels deny a voluntary sound
recording license to prevent the issuance of mastertones? Certainly,
there may well be instances where a label values its relationships with
its artists more than the potential revenue from licensing ringtones;
3
however, given the current marketplace with massive layoffs,1
severely diminishing sales figures, 14 and a need for new revenue
streams, nothing is guaranteed, especially given the fact that the
musical artists bear the sole risk to reputation. Major Labels now
appear to be more bottom-line driven than ever, 15 and with ringtones
bringing in sorely needed alternative revenues and providing market
saturation exposure for their artists in the short-term, it is unlikely
labels would forego mastertone licensing, despite the potential longterm effects on the longevity of an artist's or songwriter's career.
12.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13.
See Joseph Menn, EMI to Cut Jobs, Artists' Advances, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at Ci.
14.
See U.S. Teens Dropping Out of CD Market, CBC NEWS, Feb. 27, 2008.
15.
For example, record companies are now restructuring some of the contracts
they have with their artists into what are called "multi-platform deals," where they now
take a cut from revenue streams beyond recorded album sales, such as touring,
merchandising, publishing, sponsorships, and film, TV, book and video game projects.
Those revenue areas had traditionally been retained by the artist. See Ben Cardew, From a
Stream to a River: The Rise of the Multi-PlatformDeal, MUSIC WK., June 16, 2007, at 4.
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II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: How SONGWRITERS CAN RESPOND
A. Challengingthe Reasoning of the Ringtone Opinion
1. Ringtones Are Derivative Works by Definition
Faced with the potential tarnishing of their artistic
reputations, songwriters can respond by challenging the reasoning of
the Ringtone Opinion itself and demonstrating that a ringtone is, by
definition, a derivative work. The Copyright Act defines a derivative
work as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which,
as a whole,
16
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".

Based on a plain reading of the definition and its division into
two sentences, there appears to be two different paths that can lead to
a derivative work.
Listed first is the "recasting" prong, where
preexisting works have been "recast, transformed, or adapted" from
one form to another. 17 Dramatization, for example, is a derivative
work because it recasts a story from text to stage.18 Likewise, motion
picture versions of operas are derivative works because they recast a
work from stage to film screen. 19 The second part of the derivative
works definition is the "modifications" prong, where revisions or
modifications constitute a derivative work because, as a whole, they
"represent an original work of authorship. '20
Nowhere in the
derivative works definition does it seem .to indicate that both prongs
have to be satisfied for something to be considered a derivative work.
The Copyright Office makes this assumption when they hold that "[t]o
be considered a derivative work, a ringtone must exhibit a degree of
originality sufficient enough to be copyrightable." 21 They are, in a
sense, requiring that ringtones fall under the "modifications" prong of
derivative works; however, ringtones could potentially be derivative
16.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
17.
Id.
18.
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
19.
See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951).
20.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
21.
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery0 Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. 64,303, 64,310 n.79 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
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works under the "recasting" prong without a need to show
"modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship." 22 Indeed, under the "recasting" prong, a ringtone would
not only be an "abridgement" and a "condensation," but also a musical
work that has been "recast" as a cellular alert. In the same way that a
motion picture qualifies as a derivative work for adapting a novel from
text to film, a ringtone should qualify as a derivative work for
adapting a musical work from stereo to cellular phone speaker.
Instead of the notes of the song providing purely aesthetic pleasure, a
ringtone recasts those notes to the more utilitarian and repetitive
function of call notification and caller identification. And just as we do
not grant a compulsory license to make a motion picture whenever a
new novel is released, we must also not grant a compulsory license to
make a ringtone whenever a new song is released.
2. Ringtones Satisfy the Feist Standard for Creativity
Even if the Copyright Office's holding were to stand, and Feistlike originality is required to be a derivative work, ringtones meet that
originality standard. While Feist does hold that there can be no
copyright in a work in which "the creative spark is utterly lacking or
so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent," 23 Feist also notes that "[t]o be
sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude,
24
humble or obvious' it might be."

Indeed, the creation of ringtones meets the Feist standard
because the selection process of choosing which part of the song to use
as the ringtone possesses more than just a "humble" or "obvious"
creative spark. 25 The RIAA itself admitted as much in its oral
arguments when it explained that "record companies hire contractors
to select hooks from popular sound recordings and then create
ringtones including these hooks."26

If there is not even a "crude"

creative spark in the selection of hooks for ringtones, why must

22.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

23.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359, 363 (1991) (citation
omitted).
24.
Id. at 345 (citation omitted).
25.
See id.
26.
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. at 64,305 n.17 (citing In the Matter of Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord
Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, Oral Argument, Docket No. RF 2006-1 (Oct. 4,
2006)).
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contractors be hired at all? If it were really as mechanical and
"trivial" as the Copyright Office held it to be, why not just select the
hooks automatically with a computer or a machine? Why not just
select the first thirty seconds of a song or the last thirty seconds?
Indeed, these are not real options because it requires a creative spark
to identify successfully a song's hook for a ringtone, and a ringtone's
commercial success is likewise dependent on this creativity in
selection. This is further evidenced by the fact that for one song there
can be multiple ringtones available. If hook selection were truly a
mechanical decision with not even "crude" creativity, how could there
be more than one result?
A mechanical, discretion-less, and
thoroughly uncreative process would seem to input one song and
output one ringtone. Thus, the decision to sample a particular portion
or multiple portions of a song demonstrates sufficient creativity to
meet the Feist test.
Photographs are the perfect analogy for the creative spark
inherent in ringtone hook selection. Since the days of Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony in the late 19th century, photographs have
been recognized as creative enough to qualify for copyright
protection. 27 In photographs, the necessary creativity for a copyright,
amongst other things, comes from the effect created by the
photographer's selection of scene and setting, the framing of their
subject, and the arrangement of lighting. 28 Choosing a hook for a
ringtone is no different from framing a photograph. The song editor is
akin to the photographer; he selects the framing and point of reference
for the ringtone such that it creates a desired creative and aesthetic
effect. If photographs, which merely reproduce what is present in
reality, can exhibit enough of a "degree of creativity" in their framing
and arrangement in order to be copyrightable, mastertones, despite
merely reproducing sounds that are already captured in a sound
recording, must also embody enough creativity in the selection of song
hooks to meet the Feist standard.
B. Seeking Injunctions Under State Right of Publicity Law
Artists and performing songwriters may also be able to seek
injunctions under their state rights of publicity. 29 Because ringtones

27.

111 U.S. 53 (1884).

28.
29.

Id. at 60.
Statutory remedies vary from state to state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
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30
are marketed as lifestyle and personal identification accessories,
many ringtones are purchased primarily for the user to create an
association with the persona or image that a musical artist has
invested time and effort in developing. In effect, ringtone providers
are appropriating the commercial value of these artists' identities, and
are using the artists' personas in connection with their ringtone
services.
Because of this commercialization of artists' personas and
images in the creation of ringtones, a strong analogy can be made to
the many physical image and likeness appropriation cases under state
right of publicity law. For example, in 2005, the Seventh Circuit held

in Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. that the use of a model's likeness in

photographs for hair product packaging, beyond the contractually
31
agreed upon time period, was a violation of her right of publicity.
The court held that "'what is protected by the right of publicity is the
very identity or persona of the plaintiff as a human being."' 32 Under
equivalent reasoning, the use of an artist's identity or persona in a
ringtone, though not visible, is used in the same way to sell a product.
The artist's image is the "packaging" for the song clip; it is what
consumers perceive and evaluate when they make their ringtone
purchasing decisions. Just as it is unfair to use the physical likeness
of a person beyond contractual terms, the use of a songwriter's or
artist's persona against his wishes in the compulsory licensing of a
ringtone is equally inequitable.
For mastertones, the arguments for right of publicity protection
are even stronger. Not only is the artist's identity and persona tied up
in his name and music, but his actual voice is being used in a way so
as to create an impression of ringtone sponsorship. A number of cases
have held that such commercial exploitation of an individual's voice,
without consent, is a violation of his or her right of publicity. The
Ninth Circuit case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co. involved the use of a
Bette Midler voice impersonator in an automobile commercial that
Midler had not authorized. 33 In recognizing that the advertiser was
seeking Midler's voice as an attribute of her identity, the court held
that "[a] voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human
voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested .... The
30.
Steven Masur & Ursa Chitrakar, The History and Recurring Issues of
Ringtones: Lessons for the Future of Mobile Content, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 150
(2006) (noting that ringtones are "the mobile 'personalization' market").
406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005).
31.
Id. at 908 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY &
32.
PRIVACY § 11:52 (2d ed. 2004)).
849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
33.
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singer manifests herself in the song."3 4 Likewise, in Waits v. FritoLay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that an imitation of Tom Waits's
unique voice in a radio commercial was a misappropriation of his voice
because his voice was "widely known." 35 Considering that both Midler
and Waits provided a right of publicity remedy to artists for an
imitation of their voices, a songwriter or musical artist's claim against
an unwanted mastertone using a sound recording of his actual voice
might be an even stronger claim. Indeed, if songwriters wish to fight
against the release of unwarranted ringtones under a compulsory
license system, state rights of publicity are certainly strong grounds
for seeking possible injunctions.
III. CONCLUSION
A compulsory license for ringtones unnecessarily risks the
artistic integrity and reputation of artists and songwriters who have
no meaningful way of opting out of the licensing scheme. Thankfully,
there are significant ways their interests can be protected, both by
challenging the reasoning of the Ringtone Opinion and by arguing a
violation of their rights of publicity. Ultimately, we must hope for a
more equitable result than the existing situation. Even though fulltrack mobile downloading and user-initiated "sideloading" of MP3s
onto modern high-capacity cell phones may eventually displace hookbased ringtones, the legal treatment of ringtones is an important first
precedent in the mobile entertainment arena, and care must be taken
not to create inequitable legal paradigms for the many transitions to
come.

Id. at 463.
34.
978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by No. 90-55981, 1992 U.S. App.
35.
LEXIS 24838 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1992).

